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1: Introduction: Ngaronoa’s ambiguous legacy 
When New Zealand’s Parliament legislates to the effect that law on some particular matter may 
only be enacted using a mandated procedure, can the New Zealand judiciary enforce this provision 
against a future Parliament that fails to comply with it? This question regarding the status and 
effect of such “manner and form” requirements has been a perennial topic of public law 
discussions, primarily in relation to the Electoral Act 1993, s 268 “entrenchment provision”.1 
According to its terms, specified “reserved provisions” of New Zealand’s electoral laws may be 
amended or repealed only by the vote of either “a majority of 75 percent of all the members of 
the House of Representatives” or “a majority of the valid votes cast at a poll of the electors of the 
General and Maori electoral districts”. Law students down the years have been presented with 
various scenarios in which legislative change occurs other than in accordance with this section’s 
mandated procedures, before being asked to speculate on whether and how the judiciary should 
respond. Much to the irritation of those who expect certainty in exchange for their tuition fees, 
any answers have of necessity been somewhat speculative in the absence of any definitive ruling 
on the matter. 
 
1 For New Zealand academic commentary on this question, see DB Collins “A Constitutional 
Conundrum” [1975] NZLJ 195; FM Brookfield “Parliamentary Supremacy and Constitutional 
Entrenchment: A Jurisprudential Approach” (1984) 5 Otago L Rev 603; John Caldwell “Judicial 
Sovereignty – A New View” [1984] NZLJ 357; BV Harris “The Law-Making Powers of the New 
Zealand General Assembly: Time to Think about Change” (1984) 5 Otago L Rev 565; Jerome B 
Elkind, “A New Look at Entrenchment” (1987) 50 MLR 158; PA Joseph “Constitutional 
Entrenchment and the MMP Referendum” (1994) 16 NZULR 67; David McGee “Parliament and 
the Law – Some Recent Developments” (1996) 6 Canterbury L Rev 195; Andrew Geddis “‘Manner 
and Form’ in the House of Lords” [2005] NZLJ 415; Phillip Joseph Constitutional and Administrative 
Law in New Zealand (4th ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2014) ch 16; Bruce Harris, New Zealand 
Constitution: An Analysis in Terms of Principles (Thomson Reuters, Auckland, 2018) 95-102.  
2018 offered an apparent opportunity to confer a measure of certainty in this area of law. 
In Ngaronoa v Attorney-General,2 the Supreme Court had to decide first whether a 2010 enactment 
removing the right to enrol to vote from all serving prisoners involved an amendment to one of s 
268’s reserved provisions; and if so, whether the failure to pass that amendment by the required 
parliamentary supermajority rendered it invalid.3 However, the majority’s negative answer to the 
first question4 enabled it to avoid deciding the second in these terms:5 
It is accordingly not necessary for us to consider relief and, in particular, the 
enforceability of s 268. On that point, the Solicitor-General conceded that if s 
268(1)(e) was engaged by the 2010 Amendment, the Court could declare the 
Amendment invalid. The enforceability of entrenchment provisions like s 268 has 
been the subject of debate over a number of years both in New Zealand and in 
comparable jurisdictions.
 
Those authorities indicate the pendulum has swung in 
favour of enforceability but we would prefer that issue to be resolved after argument 
on the point.  
As such, Ngaronoa ultimately failed to provide a clear determination of the judiciary’s role in relation 
to manner and form provisions, instead only hinting that the courts may follow “the pendulum[’s 
swing]” in a future case. 
 In the wake of Ngaronoa’s somewhat inconclusive outcome, this article examines why the 
issue of judicial enforcement of manner and form provisions still remains controversial in New 
Zealand. It does so by first setting the issue in a wider constitutional framework, explaining how 
the enforcement of provisions such as s 268 involves questions regarding the nature of 
 
2 [2018] NZSC 123. 
3 The legislation in question, the Electoral (Disqualification of Sentenced Prisoners) Amendment 
Act 2010, only passed the House by a 63-58 majority (or, with the votes of 52 percent of all MPs). 
4 For a discussion of the Court’s treatment of this matter, see Andrew Geddis, “New Zealand’s 
Supreme Court Considers Prisoner Voting – Twice”, U.K. Const. L. Blog (21st Dec. 2018) 
(available at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/). 
5 Ngaronoa v Attorney General [2018] NZSC 123 at [70] (internal citation omitted). Elias CJ dissented 
from the majority’s finding on the first question, holding that the disenfranchisement of prisoners 
did involve an amendment to one of s 268’s reserved provisions. However, she restricted her 
comments on the second question to noting that: “It was acknowledged by the Solicitor-General 
that, if that position was reached, the 2010 Amendment Act would be ineffective. As my view is a 
minority one it is unnecessary for me to consider the form of relief that might otherwise have been 
appropriate.” Ibid. at [159]. 
parliamentary sovereignty and the role of the courts in defining this. The way in which these 
questions have been addressed over time in New Zealand and elsewhere—the pendulum swing of 
constitutional understandings, to use the Supreme Court’s term—is then outlined. Our purpose 
in doing so is to show that different views have waxed and waned over time, with the widely-
shared contemporary interpretation of Parliament’s power to bind itself in law actually founded 
on a somewhat shaky basis. We then draw on this analysis to examine why the Supreme Court in 
Ngaronoa would have felt unable to resolve the particular question of enforceability, while also 
raising an as-yet unexamined question about how such enforcement would mesh with the 
statutorily guaranteed parliamentary privilege of non-interference in the internal affairs of the 
House. As a result, we conclude that because it is unlikely this issue will come before the courts 
again in the near term, continued uncertainty over the law in this area is set to continue. 
 
2: How legislative entrenchment sits within New Zealand’s constitution 
Almost all of the New Zealand Parliament’s law-making takes place according to procedures 
devised by the House of Representatives and recorded in the form of Standing Orders. 
Compliance with Standing Orders then is purely a matter for the House itself; a long line of judicial 
authority expressly holds that the courts lack jurisdiction to inquire into such questions and so a 
failure to observe their requirements cannot impugn an enactment’s validity.6 However, two 
statutory provisions also speak directly to parliamentary law-making practices.7 First, the 
Constitution Act 1986, s 16 states that “A Bill passed by the House of Representatives shall 
 
6 British Railways Board v Pickin [1974] UKHL 1; [1974] AC 765 (HL); Rothmans of Pall Mall (NZ) Ltd 
v Attorney-General [1990] NZHC 632; [1991] 2 NZLR 323 at 330; Berkett v Tauranga District Court 
[1992] 3 NZLR 206; Milroy v Attorney-General [2003] NZCA 97; [2005] NZAR 562; Jennings v 
Buchanan [2004] NZPC 4; [2005] 2 NZLR 577; Ngati Whatua Orakei Trust v Attorney General [2018] 
NZSC 84 at [37]. 
7 A third statutory provision, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 7 imposes a (non-
reviewable) duty on the Attorney General in order to assist the House in its legislative functions; 
see Boscawen v Attorney-General [2009] NZCA 12; [2009] 2 NZLR 229 at [32]. 
become law when the Sovereign or the Governor-General assents to it and signs it in token of 
such assent.” While appearing to impose a restriction on parliamentary processes, this provision 
actually does nothing more than declare the previously established constitutional position that the 
House and Sovereign must combine to enact legislation. Second, and most relevantly, the Electoral 
Act 1993, s 268 contains the following manner and form requirement: 
268 Restriction on amendment or repeal of certain provisions 
(1) This section applies to the following provisions (hereinafter referred to as reserved 
provisions), namely,— 
(a) section 17(1) of the Constitution Act 1986, relating to the term of Parliament: 
(b) section 28, relating to the Representation Commission: 
(c) section 35, and the definition of the term General electoral population in section 
3(1), relating to the division of New Zealand into electoral districts after each census: 
(d) section 36, relating to the allowance for the adjustment of the quota: 
(e) section 74, and the definition of the term adult in section 3(1), and section 60(f), 
so far as those provisions prescribe 18 years as the minimum age for persons 
qualified to be registered as electors or to vote: 
(f) section 168, relating to the method of voting. 
(2) No reserved provision shall be repealed or amended unless the proposal for the 
amendment or repeal— 
(a) is passed by a majority of 75% of all the members of the House of 
Representatives; or 
(b) has been carried by a majority of the valid votes cast at a poll of the electors of 
the General and Maori electoral districts: 
provided that this section shall not apply to the repeal of any reserved provision by a 
consolidating Act in which that provision is re-enacted without amendment and this 
section is re-enacted without amendment so as to apply to that provision as re-
enacted. 
This procedural constraint first was introduced by the Electoral Act 1956 and is unique in its 
source and potential effect. Obviously, it is a statutory requirement and not a Standing Order. As 
such, it is not simply a rule of the House, by the House and for the House. It is rather a procedure 
that Parliament has imposed upon the House through an enactment. This fact means the House 
is not able to dispense with its requirements by a mere majority motion to suspend, amend or 
revoke its effect.8 Any change to its terms instead requires a full repeal or amendment of the 
statutory provision.9 Consequently, does this (statutorily mandated) process impose a legally 
binding and judicially enforceable constraint upon parliamentary law-making practices, such that 
a failure to comply with its terms would render any resultant legislation invalid? 
In New Zealand’s constitutional context, where “Parliament may make or unmake any law 
it wishes, unconstrained by any entrenched or codified constitution”,10 answering this question 
involves grappling with the following paradox:11 
… if Parliament is sovereign, there is nothing it cannot do by legislation; if there is 
nothing Parliament cannot do by legislation it may bind itself hand and foot by 
legislation; if Parliament so binds itself by legislation there are things which it cannot 
do by legislation; and if there are such things Parliament is not sovereign. 
This paradox exists irrespective of whether Parliament seeks to use legislation to impose 
substantive constraints upon its law-making powers (identify subject matter it may not legislate for 
at all), or forms of procedural entrenchment (matters that require a special legislative process to 
make law on).12 Expressed simply, it requires deciding whether the 1956 (and, subsequently, the 
1993) Parliament possessed the legal power to set the conditions under which the 2010 (or other 
subsequent) Parliament may change certain legislation. If the answer is yes, the legislative 
supremacy of all Parliaments since 1956 has been constrained in that they could only alter the 
 
8 Compare with Standing Orders 4 and 6. 
9 While s 268 has not itself been entrenched (thus representing a form of single, rather than 
double, entrenchment), there still is a question as to whether altering its terms would require a 
75% majority vote of MPs or majority vote at a referendum. See below at n 47; Jackson v Attorney-
General (2005) U.K.H.L. 56, (2006) 1 A.C. 262, at [59] (per Lord Nichols); Canadian Taxpayers 
Federation v Ontario (Minister of Finance) (2004) 73 OR (3d) 621 (ONSC).  
10 Taylor v Attorney-General [2017] NZCA 215; [2017] 3 NZLR 24 at [44]. This proposition is 
affirmed in the Constitution Act 1986, s 15 (“The Parliament of New Zealand continues to have 
full power to make laws”). 
11 HR Gray “The Sovereignty of Parliament Today” (1953) 10 UTLJ 54, 54; Michael Gordon 
Parliamentary Sovereignty in the UK Constitution: Process, Politics and Democracy (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
2015) 57. 
12 B V Harris “The Law-Making Powers of the New Zealand General Assembly: Time to Think 
about Change” (1984) 5 Otago L Rev 565, 575. 
reserved provisions by using the entrenchment provision’s especially demanding process.13 If not, 
then every New Zealand Parliament lacks the capacity to accomplish some legislative objective; 
namely, dictate how its enactments must be addressed by later Parliaments.  
 It should be noted that the question here is more one of formal legal authority (and, 
relatedly, judicial powers of enforcement) than actual outcome.14 In practice, New Zealand’s 
House of Representatives consistently has abided by the entrenchment provision’s manner and 
form requirement even when (as shall be seen) it did not consider itself bound to do so by law.15 
That is to say, as a matter of political morality or constitutional propriety, members of Parliament always 
have believed that they ought to respect the entrenchment provision and refrain from legislating 
other than in accordance with its terms. What remains unsettled is the consequences should there 
ever be a failure to so comply: whether deliberate in nature; through inadvertent oversight; or 
because of a misunderstanding of the effect of some legislative amendment. Would such a 
legislative step trigger only political and constitutional criticism, perhaps combined with an 
expectation that Parliament act to reverse its action, or would it be susceptible to judicial 
intervention to declare the invalidity of the law in question? 
 Academic and judicial views on this question have divided starkly between proponents of 
the so-called “continuing” and “self-embracing” schools of thought.16 On the former 
interpretation, every Parliament retains the sovereign power to enact law as it thinks fit irrespective 
 
13 Even if the entrenchment provision (which is not itself entrenched) may be amended or repealed 
by ordinary parliamentary procedures, the fact that this must occur before a reserved provision can 
be changed by a bare majority would itself constrain Parliament’s legislative processes. 
14 As such, we are applying here the sharp, legal definition of “entrenchment” as deployed by 
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, “Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal” (2002) 111 Yale 
L.J. 1665, 1667. 
15 A point noted by the Supreme Court; see Ngaronoa v Attorney-General [2018] NZSC 123 at [56]. 
16 HLA Hart The Concept of Law (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 149. 
of what previous parliaments have said on the matter.17 This position is said to reflect the 
fundamentally democratic genesis and ongoing popular accountability of this law-making 
institution:18 
… a Parliament representing one generation (loosely speaking) is purporting to lock 
in future generations … . [It] involves a strong sense of self-assuredness, of moral self-
righteousness, of one particular generation being so confident of the rightness of what 
it is doing that it seeks to make any future changes harder than what is required to 
pass an ordinary statute. 
Consequently, under this continuing theory of parliamentary sovereignty manner and form 
provisions do nothing more than suggest to law-makers the preferred or “best” way to legislate on 
particular matters, which they then may choose to ignore if they believe current circumstances 
warrant. The alternative, self-embracing or “new view” of parliamentary sovereignty holds that the 
institution may reconstitute itself as a law-making body by imposing binding constraints on its 
own legislative procedures.19 When doing so, Parliament alters the terms upon which other 
institutions (and the courts, in particular) will recognise something as comprising a “parliamentary 
enactment” and thus the law of the land.20 So, rather than enacted legislation being any and all bills 
passed by the House of Representatives and assented to by the Sovereign, Parliament may stipulate 
that on certain, specified matters an enactment is a bill passed by the House of Representatives in 
a certain way and assented to by the Sovereign.  
 As noted by the Supreme Court, the latter self-embracing account of parliamentary 
sovereignty currently enjoys something of an ascendency in constitutional thinking. Certainly, 
 
17 A V Dicey The Law of the Constitution (8th ed, MacMillan, London, 1927) at 66 (“[A] sovereign 
power cannot, while retaining its sovereign character, restrict its own powers by any particular 
enactment.”) See also H.W.R. Wade “The Basis of Legal Sovereignty” [1955] CLJ 172.  
18 James Allan “The Paradox of Sovereignty: Jackson and the Hunt for a New Rule of Recognition” 
(2007) 18 KJL 1, 14. 
19 RTE Latham “What is an Act of Parliament?” [1939] King’s Counsel 152, 152-162; Ivor 
Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (5th ed, 1959) 138-140; RFV Heuston Essays in Constitutional 
Law (2nd ed, Stevens and Sons, London, 1964, ch. 1; Jerome Elkind “A New Look at 
Entrenchment” (1987) 50(2) MLR 158, 163. 
20 Jeffrey Goldsworthy “Abdicating and Limiting Parliament’s Sovereignty” (2006) 17 KCLJ 255, 
259. 
courts in other Westminster-based parliamentary democracies have indicated that manner and 
form provisions do impose legally binding and judicially enforceable constraints on parliamentary 
law-making. In a footnote to its “pendulum swing” observation, the Supreme Court cites three 
such overseas precedents: R (Jackson) v Attorney-General;21 Attorney-General for New South Wales v 
Trethowan; 22 and R v Mercure.23 Of these, the House of Lord’s decision in Jackson perhaps is the most 
relevant, given the New Zealand Parliament’s colonial heritage and the two nations’ shared absence 
of any higher law constitutional document circumscribing parliamentary competence. Albeit in 
obiter comments, various members of the House of Lords stated that manner and form limitations 
could serve as an effective legal constraint on parliamentary law-making practices that the judiciary 
might enforce.24 Drawing heavily on these observations, the author of New Zealand’s most 
referenced work on public law, Philip Joseph, felt able to conclude his discussion of the matter in 
an unequivocal fashion: “The New Zealand position is equally clear. … The courts need entertain 
no self-doubt in applying the rule of recognition for identifying validly enacted law.”25  
However, as has been seen, the Supreme Court in Ngaronoa did not share Joseph’s 
confidence. To understand why, we first examine the arc of the pendulum’s swing on the question 
of judicial enforcement of manner and form requirements in New Zealand. This is necessary to 
give some context to our later discussion as to why these developments were not regarded as 
sufficiently persuasive to move the Supreme Court to finally resolve the issue in Ngaronoa. Indeed, 
 
21 [2005] UKHL 56, [2006] 1 AC 262. 
22 [1932] AC 526 (PC). 
23 [1988] 1 SCR 234. Additionally, the Court might have referenced the oft-cited cases of Harris v. 
Minister of the Interior, [1952] 2 S.A.L.R. (N.S.) 428 (Sth. Afr. App. Div.) and Bribery Commissioner v. 
Ranasinghe, [1965] A.C. 172, 197-198. 
24 R (Jackson) v Attorney-General [2005] UKHL 56, [2006] 1 AC 262 at [27] per Lord Bingham; [51] 
per Lord Nicholls; [81]-[85] per Lord Steyn; [162]-[163] per Baroness Hale; [174] per Lord 
Carswell. For a discussion of this case’s application to the New Zealand context, see Andrew 
Geddis “‘Manner and Form’ in the House of Lords” [2005] NZLJ 415. 
25 Phillip Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (4th ed, Brookers, Wellington, 
2014) at 607. 
as shall be seen, we will suggest that the trajectory of change has not been quite as clear cut as 
perhaps has been assumed in recent years. 
 
3: Tracking the pendulum’s swing in New Zealand 
Elizabeth McLeay’s recently published history of the Electoral Act 1956’s entry onto the statute 
books provides a definitive account of the social, political and constitutional context in which the 
(now) s 268 entrenchment provision first came into being.26 To summarise and simplify her 
analysis, it represented a pact between New Zealand’s two dominant political parties that certain 
features of the electoral process—recently the subject of heated dispute between them—would 
henceforth be removed from the possibility of partisan manipulation. McLeay also notes that this 
constitutional innovation subsequently has “helped stimulate more nuanced interpretations of 
parliamentary sovereignty than presented in the political debates of the 1950s”.27 However, her 
discussion of this development simply observes that “[the] provision placed parliamentary 
sovereignty on the constitutional agenda and made it just that much more vulnerable to 
challenge.”28 Indeed, there has not been a comprehensive account of the changing assumptions 
about the legal efficacy of entrenchment since the enactment of the Electoral Act 1956. The extent 
of that shift in thinking may be illustrated by contrasting the Attorney-General’s remark to the 
House in 1956 that “[w]hat we are doing has a moral sanction rather than a legal one”29 with the 
Solicitor-General’s concession before the Supreme Court in 2018 that “if the manner and form 
provision interpreted by this Court has not been met, then the consequence is that the 2010 Act 
has been invalidly enacted, and has no effect”.30 The absence of any explanation for when and how 
 
26 Elizabeth McLeay In Search of Consensus: New Zealand’s Electoral Act 1956 and its Constitutional 
Legacy (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2018). 
27 Ibid at 190. 
28 Ibid at 191. 
29 (26 October 1956) 310 NZPD 2839 (Hon Jack Marshall, Attorney-General) 
30 Ngaronoa v Attorney-General Transcript SC 102/2017, 26 March 2018 at 59. 
this apparent constitutional volte face took place perhaps is testament to the fact that it is difficult 
to impose order on a process that, as will be seen, largely has been incoherent. However, by 
examining parliamentary debate, judicial decisions, and academic commentary across 63 years, the 
outline of a narrative emerges. There have broadly been three differing (roughly chronological, 
albeit very much overlapping) conceptions of the entrenchment provision’s efficacy: that it 
possesses only moral force; that it imposes a legal constraint on the House; and that it creates a 
precondition for valid law-making.  
 
3.1 Entrenchment as a compact: “… a moral sanction rather than a legal one” 
 
When the entrenchment provision first was made a part of New Zealand law, constitutional 
orthodoxy held that it could only be a moral or political compact rather than a legally efficacious 
constraint on parliamentary behaviour. For instance, the 1952 Report of the Constitutional Reform 
Committee suggested that Parliament “could bind itself in statute and hope its successors would 
feel equally constrained” but that “it could not easily bind them” by a “legally effective” process.31 
This view also was dominant in the parliamentary debate surrounding the Electoral Act 1956’s 
passage. The Attorney-General sought to “make it perfectly clear” that the provisions had a “moral 
force as representing [Parliament’s] unanimous view” rather than a “legal force”.32 Other members 
noted that Parliament “cannot be bound by the actions of any of its predecessors”33 and referred 
instead to “a strong moral obligation”.34  
Parliament’s view that the entrenchment provision possessed morally persuasive, not 
legally binding, status remained in evidence when it legislated to lower the voting age to 20 in 1969 
 
31 Constitutional Reform Committee, Appendix A, ‘How Constitutions Can be Created’, Report of 
the Constitutional Reform Committee, AJHR (1952), I-18, 38. 
32 (26 October 1956) 310 NZPD 2839 (Hon Jack Marshall, Attorney-General) 
33 Ibid at 2847. 
34 Ibid at 2850. 
and then 18 in 1974.35 As both these votes carried “on the voices”, there is no record of whether 
the requirement that “75 percent of all members” assent to the change was met.36 The House’s 
failure to tally the total number of votes indicates that parliamentarians were content that their 
unanimous (ergo, cross-party) support satisfied the provision’s solely moral imperative; we would 
have expected to see more scrupulous procedures adopted if compliance with the entrenching 
provision was considered to be a necessary legal requirement. As such, a contemporary 
commentator labelled this failure to record whether the terms of the entrenchment provision were 
met as being “a poor reflection on our legislative procedures”.37 Indeed, if strict compliance with 
the manner and form requirements were a precondition of valid law making, it is possible that the 
failure to record the numbers meant that for many years the votes of 18 to 21 year olds potentially 
could be challenged in any electoral petition. Revealingly, this prospect was dismissed at the time 
as “of course” any such challenge to the validity of the resultant Acts would not succeed because 
“[a]t the time the Governor-General gave his assent to the Bill… Parliament impliedly repealed 
[the entrenching provision]”.38  
Academic writings on the 1956 Act further demonstrate that the contemporary consensus 
recognised only a moral constraint. While Keith Scott’s view in 1962 was that the Electoral Act 
provided as close to a written constitution as New Zealand gets,39 its entrenchment provision 
nevertheless had “no superior legal sanctity of an effective matter, [only] a superior moral sanctity” 
as a form of statutory recognition of an agreement reached between the country’s two political 
parties.40 Further, he considered that “the weight of evidence” indicated that the domestic New 
 
35 (20 August 1969) 362 NZPD 2107 and Electoral Amendment Act 1969; (19 September 1974) 
394 NZPD 4368-4369 and Electoral Amendment Act 1974. 
36 Electoral Act 1956, s 189(2)(a) (emphasis added). 
37 DB Collins “A Constitutional Conundrum” [1975] NZLJ 195, 196. 
38 Ibid at 196. 
39 KJ Scott The New Zealand Constitution (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1962) at 8-9. 
40 Ibid at 8. 
Zealand Courts and the Privy Council would consider “that entrenching provisions are not legally 
effective to achieve their purpose”.41 Aikman and Robson in 1967 likewise characterised the 
provision as “no more than a noble gesture”.42 And as recently as 1984, Bruce Harris stated that 
“doubts surround” the legal effectiveness of entrenchment and that the “predominant approach 
amongst English commentators” is that it is not effective.43  
There has been something of a recent tendency to mischaracterise these earlier arguments 
as suggesting that the barrier to legal efficacy was that Parliament remained free to amend or repeal 
the entrenching provision itself, before proceeding to amend or repeal one of the protected 
reserved provisions (the so-called “two-step solution”).44 However, earlier comments clearly were 
not intended in these terms. Parliament and commentators alike focussed on the moral constraint 
created by the compact reached between the two parliamentary parties, with only rare references 
to the prospect of such a two-step solution. In the 1956 debate, for example, one member stated 
simply that a “determined enough” Government could “say it has the right to make laws and not 
be bound by anything that had been passed previously”.45 Indeed, this view remains apparent as 
late as the debate about the Electoral Reform Bill in 1993.46 Interestingly, there was very little direct 
comment on the legal effect of entrenchment at that time, with the impending arrival of MMP 
 
41 Ibid at 41. 
42 JL Robson (ed) New Zealand: The Development of its Laws and Constitution (2nd ed, Stevens and 
Sons, London, 1967) at 36; a similar view was expressed in an article of a similar time period, A 
C Brassington “The Constitution of New Zealand – Aspects of Change and Development” 
[1963] NZLJ 213, 217-218. See also: JL Robson (ed) New Zealand: The Development of its Laws and 
Constitution (1st ed, Stevens and Sons, London, 1954) at 50-51. 
43 BV Harris “The Law-Making Powers of the New Zealand General Assembly: Time to Think 
about Change” (1984) 5 Otago L Rev 565, 579, 580. 
44 See, especially: “A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper” (Government Printer, 
Wellington, 1985) at 7.9. 
45 (26 October 1956) 310 NZPD 2848. 
46 On this, see: PA Joseph “Constitutional Entrenchment and the MMP Referendum” (1994) 16 
NZULR 67. 
likely providing a distraction. The Attorney-General did, however, discuss the entrenchment 
provision of the still-in-force 1956 Act in these terms:47 
… it has been argued that in theory it is possible … to repeal section 189 by a simple 
majority, then to proceed to amend or repeal the provisions that were entrenched … 
. But the reality is that it is not an option … [as s 189] registers an agreement between 
the parties in Parliament … . To proceed otherwise than in accordance with the 
requirements of section 189… would be to expose this House to allegations of 
political abuse and to allegations of having breached constitutional conventions. 
 
Unlike earlier debates, this contribution makes direct reference to the two-step solution. However, 
the Attorney’s reference to “an agreement between the parties” and “constitutional conventions” 
continues to place the entrenchment provision’s enforcement in the realm of the political. It 
nevertheless was his view that “this forthcoming referendum should proceed in terms of [the 
entrenching provision]”.48  
In Re Hunua Election Petition, however, the beginnings of change can be found. The full 
(then) Supreme Court stated its view that:49 
In the absence of a constitution it is difficult to appreciate that [s 268] is 
entrenched within the true meaning of that term but suffice it to say that this 
Court must take notice of the fact that the legislature has indicated that the 
section is of special significance in that it is provided that it shall not be repealed 
or amended unless [the requirements are met] 
 
These comments are difficult to understand, and Harris and Brookfield both cautioned against 
reading too much into them.50 Reference to “special significance” potentially refers to the moral 
compact view outlined above. However, the Court also states it must “take notice” of this fact in 
some form. Here, we may detect the beginning of a transition from the political (or moral) realm 
to the legal.  
 
47 (3 August 1993) 537 NZPD 17140-17141. 
48 (3 August 1993) 537 NZPD 17141. 
49 Re Hunua Election Petition [1979] 1 NZLR 251 (SC), 298. 
50 B V Harris “The Law-Making Powers of the New Zealand General Assembly: Time to Think 
about Change” (1984) 5 Otago L Rev 565, 581; FM Brookfield “Parliamentary Supremacy and 
Constitutional Entrenchment: A Jurisprudential Approach” (1984) 5 Otago L Rev 603, 631. 
 
2.3 Entrenchment as a legal constraint on the House: “Imping[ing] on our procedures” 
 
Over time, the House began to consider itself bound by law to respect the entrenching provision, 
rather than simply being under a moral obligation to respect it. However, that parliamentary 
recognition did not necessarily embrace a view that the courts could examine whether its 
requirements were met as a precondition for valid law-making. This distinction turns on the 
House’s right to exclusive cognisance, an aspect of parliamentary privilege.51 Although “Parliament 
is subject to law just like every other person and body in New Zealand; it is bound by statutory 
requirements”,52 the constitutional position is “that it is exclusively for the House itself to 
administer that part of statute law which relates to its internal proceedings.”53 The New Zealand 
courts traditionally have affirmed this principle.54 Consequently, insofar as the entrenchment 
provision imposed statutory constraints upon the House’s legislative procedures, it fell to the 
House itself to determine what those constraints are and how they must be met.  
Walter Nash, Leader of the Opposition in 1956, provided an early sign of what was to come 
when he stated during parliamentary debate that:55 
I do not know how this Parliament can write a law which all other subsequent 
Parliaments must abide by … . In the House itself none of those provisions may be 
amended or repealed without the approval of 75 per cent of the Members. 
Nash, unlike most of his colleagues in that debate, made explicit reference to the entrenchment 
provision’s effect as being something more than moral in nature. However, his reference to “[i]n 
the House itself” may illustrate a view that its terms were only for the House to enforce. The 
 
51 Mary Harris and David Wilson (eds), McGee: Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand (4th ed, Oratia 
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Speaker expressed similar views in 1975 when stating that the entrenching provision “impinges on 
our procedures” and that the Committee of the Whole had agreed it “would be strictly applied to 
questions affecting the reserved provisions”.56 Immediately after this ruling, although an 
amendment passed by a simple majority, “[t]he requisite majority not having been obtained the 
chairman declared the motion lost”.57 
Following this precedent, the Speaker made two specific rulings in 1980 as to 
entrenchment’s effect on the House’s procedures, indicating that he considered himself to be the 
arbiter of compliance. He ruled that “the 75 percent vote is required at the point at which the 
relevant clause is being considered in the Committee of the whole”58 and that “if it is carried on 
the voices it is deemed to be carried unanimously, and no question arises as to the number 
present”.59 Both rulings strain the actual statutory language, which requires that a Bill be “passed by 
a majority of 75% of all the members of the House of Representatives.” Writing in 1984, Jock 
Brookfield considered these rulings to be a significant turning point in recognising the legal nature 
of the rules.60 For while both display a procedural pragmatism suggesting that cross-party consent 
to change continued to be the House’s primary concern, they demonstrate an institutional 
acceptance that it was unavoidably constrained in its law-making processes. Consequently, 
Brookfield stated both that the provisions provide “very modest but nevertheless real legal 
protection”61 and that they constitute a form of “moral entrenchment”.62 He admitted that his 
argument in favour of real legal protection had “no support in New Zealand judicial authority”63 
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and his view was that if compliance was to be enforced it was best to occur before formal 
enactment, with the Governor-General’s possible refusal to assent to a non-compliant Bill 
providing “some safeguard”.64 Openly acknowledging a shifting consensus he stated that: “changes 
in the facts of constitutional life may be such that they ultimately become part of the law, whether 
those changes have taken place with revolutionary abruptness or through the slow evolutionary 
force of custom.” 65 
The subsequent year’s publication of the first edition of David McGee’s treatise on 
parliamentary procedure expressly endorsed the view that the entrenchment provision places a 
legal constraint on Parliament’s law-making processes.66 However, citing cases dealing with the 
exclusive cognisance privilege,67 McGee noted:68  
It would seem … it is for the House to apply the statute to its own proceedings and 
that the courts would not and could not control the manner in which the House did 
this. It is also unlikely that a challenge to the validity of the resultant Act on the ground 
of non-compliance with the Electoral Act would succeed. 
Further referencing the Court of Appeal’s dicta in Simpson v Attorney General,69 McGee stated; 
“Once the Royal Assent has been given to a bill, any previous defects – whether related to the 
procedure for its passing or to the constitution of the body which passed it – would seem to be 
irrelevant.”70 Bruce Harris similarly was of the view that “it is unlikely that New Zealand courts 
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would uphold such restrictions” until the “General Assembly acting by a majority of one no longer 
has supreme law-making powers.”71 
The High Court’s ruling in Thomas v Bolger (No 2) also accords with this understanding of 
the legal position.72 In Thomas, an unintentional gap in transitional provisions in the Electoral 
Reform Bill of 1995 meant that members of Parliament were not technically defined as such for 
the purposes of the entrenching provision.73 Justice Gallen focussed on the House’s role in 
ensuring compliance when he stated “the legislators will debate the matter in the knowledge of the 
legal situation which they have themselves created in the legislation already passed.”74 His Honour 
expressed reluctance to intervene because of “the undesirability of the Courts becoming involved 
in the legislative process” and the “greater undesirability” of an “open and obvious conflict 
between Parliament and the Courts”.75 Interestingly, he stated that challenge after enactment 
would pose “difficult questions of law and [a] conflict between the appropriate authorities … and 
… questions as to whether or not Parliament is able to pass legislation of this kind”.76 As it 
transpired, Parliament cured the potential loophole by adding members elected in accordance with 
the 1956 Act to the relevant definition.77 
 
2.4 The “triteness” of entrenchment as a precondition for valid law-making 
 
In more recent times the pendulum appears to have swung further still. An increasing volume of 
commentary now holds that the House is not only legally obliged to comply with the entrenchment 
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provision’s manner and form requirements, but also that such compliance is a precondition for 
parliamentary law-making. Upon this view, the House is not the sole arbiter of those manner and 
form requirements; rather, should the House fail to properly abide by them the Courts may declare 
that the resultant “enactment” is not valid law.78 The 1985 Bill of Rights White Paper provided an 
early example of this shift in thinking. Citing overseas precedent,79 it claimed that in enacting 
manner and form requirements, “Parliament is not binding its successors, but only redefining 
‘Parliament’”.80 Reference also is made to supposed substantive limits on Parliament’s powers 
(such as those in Cooke’s dicta) as contributing to “the growing legal opinion that it is possible to 
restrain future Parliaments in the ways indicated”.81  
However, the real driver of this changed view has come from the judiciary. In a series of 
unsuccessful cases seeking to challenge Parliament’s substantive law-making power, the courts took 
the opportunity to make passing comment on the nature of procedural restrictions on legislative 
processes. In Shaw v Commissioner for Inland Revenue, the Court of Appeal stated that under the 
Declaratory Judgments Act 1908, s 3 the Court had the power: “to consider the validity of 
legislation… [in] ensuring that a statute was properly enacted; in other words the Court may 
determine whether Parliament itself has followed the laws that govern the manner in which 
legislation is created.”82 No direct reference is made to s 268’s manner and form requirements, and 
it is possible that the Court did not have these directly in mind when it wrote. Furthermore, the 
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Declaratory Judgments Act power may originally have been intended to enable consideration of 
compliance with the (then) substantive constraints on Parliament imposed by the New Zealand 
Constitution Act 1856 (UK).83 However, in Westco Lagan Ltd v Attorney-General (another failed 
challenge to the substantive law-making powers of Parliament), McGechan J directly linked the 
entrenchment provision with the comments in Shaw.84 Although his Honour noted that he was 
“pressed for time”, he nevertheless took the opportunity to consider the general legal efficacy of 
manner and form requirements.85 His view was simple and unequivocal: “I have no doubt that this 
Court has jurisdiction to determine whether there has been compliance with any mandatory 
“manner and form” requirements imposed by statute law for the enactment of legislation by 
Parliament.”86 His Honour considered that jurisdiction “must exist as a matter of principle”, and 
that “from a constitutional point of view it is quite simply necessary”.87 In his Honour’s view, the 
best time for the Court to intervene would be “between third reading and assent, if only because 
by that stage fullest and last opportunities for the House to observe mandatory procedures would 
have ended”.88 
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Similar judicial views repeatedly have been aired since.89 Perhaps most notably, in Taylor v 
Attorney-General Ellis J flatly noted that it was “not disputed that non-compliance [with the 
entrenching provision] would invalidate the amendment”, before citing Westco Lagan to cursorily 
deem the claim “trite”.90 Further, Ellis J stated she had “some reservations about the correctness 
of the proposition that an entrenched provision is only protected from direct, rather than implied, 
amendment or repeal”.91 Although none of these cases actually required a judicial determination 
as to whether a reserved provision had been correctly altered, the courts clearly considered that 
they were competent to consider if Parliament had complied with the manner and form 
requirements and respond appropriately if it has not. As already noted, in the latest edition of his 
seminal text Philip Joseph cites these statements as evidence that a “shift in judicial attitude is 
discernible over the past 60 years”, consequently declaring that it is now “clear” that entrenchment 
is legally effective and judicially enforceable.92  
Most recently, the oral arguments in the Supreme Court in Ngaronoa illustrated the assumed 
extent of this new consensus.93 The Solicitor-General bluntly stated:94 
... there might have been some surprise at the proposition that if the manner and form 
provisions haven't been met then the Court can declare the legislation invalid. That is 
not a controversial proposition … if Parliament breaches a manner and form 
provision, its subsequent enactments isn’t validly passed law … . 
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Although not in the Solicitor-General’s mind “controversial”, this part has demonstrated that the 
proposition is relatively new to New Zealand law. However, she later suggested that “[the 1956 
Parliament] thought that the entrenchment provisions … were going to have moral suasion only, 
but in my submission we’ve moved well past that as a proposition”.95 This movement is, the 
Solicitor-General opined, the result of “a maturation of how we understand our constitutional 
framework”.96 Exactly what was meant by this “maturation” claim was unfortunately not spelled 
out, as the Supreme Court bench chose not to seek clarification on the point, or to really 
interrogate the Crown’s position at all.97 Consequently, the Crown simply asked the Court to affirm 
an allegedly settled point of law without much further by way of argument. The Court then chose 
not to do so. We turn now to give some explanation for why it may have made that decision.  
 
4: Explaining the Supreme Court’s hesitancy in Ngaronoa   
Whilst somewhat frustrating for constitutional law scholars and students, a number of reasons can 
be given to justify the Supreme Court’s decision to defer reaching a conclusion on s 268’s judicial 
enforceability. We have noted that when this entrenchment provision’s precursor first was 
introduced via the Electoral Act 1956, it universally was presumed to possess only a “moral force 
as representing [Parliament’s] unanimous view” rather than any “legal force”.98 That view reflected 
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WILLIAM YOUNG J:  
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by this Court has not been met, then the consequence is that the 2010 Act has been 
invalidly enacted, and has no effect.  
 Ibid at 59. 
98 (26 October 1956) 310 NZPD 2839 (Hon Jack Marshall, Attorney-General) 
the contemporary constitutional orthodoxy of continuing parliamentary sovereignty, which 
stipulated that the 1956 Parliament lacked the power in law to dictate a future Parliament’s law-
making processes. And although the last twenty years have seen multiple obiter judicial statements 
that s 268 should instead be taken to represent a parliamentary imposed, judicially enforceable 
legal fetter on how the House may alter the reserved provisions, competing dicta still exist. Indeed, 
as recently as 2017 the full Court of Appeal unanimously cited and affirmed Wade’s view of 
parliamentary sovereignty when opining:99 
[Parliament] experiences constraints of various kinds. Those that concern us are legal 
in nature. The principal such constraint is the rule that Parliament cannot bind its 
successors. That is a necessary corollary of Parliament’s continuing supremacy, but it 
is also a rule of the common law.  
The Court of Appeal’s position reflects a significant line of authority from both the United 
Kingdom100 and New Zealand.101 Consequently, pace the Solicitor-General’s claim during oral 
arguments, it is not clear that the new view of self-embracing parliamentary sovereignty has yet 
reached the same status of “not … controversial” constitutional orthodoxy in New Zealand as the 
continuing sovereignty theory enjoyed in 1956. 
Furthermore, the rationale for such a constitutional volte-face in New Zealand has not 
really been explained satisfactorily.102 The most a court has said on the issue is Fisher J’s assertion 
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that “from a constitutional point of view it is quite simply necessary” for the courts to be able to 
enforce a manner and form provision’s terms.103 Just what renders judicial intervention so 
“necessary” was not spelt out. If the fear is that in its absence the House will simply ignore s 268’s 
dictates, then the unblemished 63-year history of parliamentary respect for the procedural 
requirements should somewhat allay it. And a general claim that legal constraint always entails 
judicial enforcement seems to ignore the existence of Parliament’s exclusive cognisance privilege, 
which demonstrates that law can (and does) operate outside of the courts’ jurisdiction on occasion. 
Fisher J would seem to instead have in mind something like the Solicitor-General’s suggestion to 
the Supreme Court that “a maturation of how we understand our constitutional framework” has 
conferred this role upon the judiciary. Such a claim then begs the joint questions of how and why 
this quite radical shift in constitutional assumptions has taken place. 
Of course, the Supreme Court—New Zealand’s apex authority on the interpretation of 
our law—is capable of filling in that blank space. It could have, for example, articulated an account 
of the judiciary’s relationship with Parliament that echoed the “co-dependent” analysis set out by 
the full Court of Appeal in Attorney General v Taylor, in which:104  
Courts will also declare void any act of “any organ of government, whether legislature 
or administrative”, that exceed the limits of the power that organ derives from the 
law. This principle too is not radical; again, Dicey recognised it. It may apply when the 
legislature relies on a power of enactment derived from another statute.  
However, as Edward Willis notes in relation to the Supreme Court’s subsequent and far narrower 
decision in Taylor,105 this is not an institution that favours such expansive forms of analysis. Rather, 
“it develops the law incrementally, slowly, cautiously, because it can’t always easily point to a source 
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of authority outside of itself to justify the grand constitutional conclusions we might otherwise 
expect.”106 Given its finding that no reserved provision had been amended, meaning there was no 
live remedial issue before it, the Court clearly decided Ngaronoa was not the occasion for making 
sweeping claims about its role vis-à-vis the legislative branch of government. Furthermore, as a 
matter of judicial craft, the weight the Court placed on Parliament’s intent when establishing the 
ambit of s 268’s reach107 made it difficult to ignore parliamentary assumptions as to how those 
protections should be enforced. At the least, it would have required the Court to explain why 
Parliament’s intentions as to which aspects of the electoral system received procedural protection 
mattered so much, while Parliament’s original understanding of the nature of that protection can 
and should be set aside. 
Finally, there is an issue not discussed at any stage of the Ngaronoa litigation, but which 
really ought to receive a measure of judicial consideration before conclusively declaring a power 
to invalidate legislation for failure to meet a manner and form provision. That is the matter of 
parliamentary privilege; in particular, the principle of non-interference in parliamentary 
proceedings. If a referendum is not used to alter one of the reserved provisions, then s 268(2) 
stipulates a parliamentary supermajority must be obtained. Determining whether more than 75 
percent of all MPs actually voted for the change then necessarily requires that a court examine the 
voting numbers in the House. However, the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014, s 11(c) states: 
In proceedings in a court or tribunal, evidence must not be offered or received … 
concerning proceedings in Parliament … for the purpose of … drawing, or inviting 
the drawing of, inferences or conclusions wholly or partly from anything forming part 
of those proceedings in Parliament. 
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This legislative restatement of parliament’s freedom from external intervention was, it should be 
recalled, enacted in response to perceived judicial overreach into the House’s business.108 For this 
reason, the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014, s 4(b) instructs that:  
This Act must be interpreted in a way that … promotes the principle of comity that 
requires the separate and independent legislative and judicial branches of government 
each to recognise, with the mutual respect and restraint that is essential to their 
important constitutional relationship, the other’s proper sphere of influence and 
privilege. 
 Any assessment of the courts’ “proper sphere of influence” in regards the entrenched 
provisions then will have to reckon with the judiciary’s historical refusal to critically examine any 
aspect of the legislative process. For example, in Edinburgh and Dalkeith Railway Co v Wauchope Lord 
Reid noted:109 
All that a Court of Justice can do is to look to the Parliamentary roll: if from that it 
should appear that a bill has passed both Houses and received the Royal assent, no 
Court of Justice can inquire into the mode in which it was introduced into Parliament, 
nor into what was done previous to its introduction, or what passed in Parliament 
during its various stages through both Houses.  
And in Attorney-General v Taylor, the full New Zealand Court of Appeal issued this warning whilst 
addressing the Speaker’s concerns regarding the trial court’s use of parliamentary materials when 
deciding to issue a declaration of inconsistency:110 
We acknowledge the Speaker’s concerns about Heath J’s references to the Bill’s 
passage through the House. We agree that the narrowness of the majority by which it 
passed is irrelevant, as are the identities of the parties for and against and the choice 
of select committee. To mention these facts, even in passing, is to risk being seen to 
question parliamentary proceedings. We accept that it would be better had they not 
been mentioned. 
It then proceeded to note that; “Seldom if ever will it be relevant to refer to the way in which 
members of Parliament voted on a bill, and to do so is to risk questioning proceedings in 
Parliament.”111  
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Not that the House is entirely a black box for the courts, beyond the judiciary’s purview for 
all purposes. Indeed, the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014, s 15 expressly recognises that: 
In relation to proceedings in a court or tribunal, neither this subpart nor the Bill of 
Rights 1688 prevents or restricts evidence being offered or received, questions being 
asked, or statements, submissions, or comments made, concerning proceedings in 
Parliament, by way of, or for the purpose of, establishing with no impeaching or 
questioning of the proceedings in Parliament a relevant historical event or other fact. 
This section effectively codifies the Privy Council’s ruling in Prebble v TVNZ, where their 
Lordships voiced “no objection” to a party alleging in court “the occurrence of events or the 
saying of certain words in Parliament without any accompanying allegation of impropriety or any 
other questioning”.112 The question then is, what is involved where a court is asked to look at the 
voting numbers in the House in order to determine whether they meet, or do not meet, the 
threshold imposed by s 268? Will it reach a conclusion, based on this evidence, that the resultant statute 
is, or is not, valid? If so, this outcome would seem to be prohibited by the wording of the 
Parliamentary Privilege Act. Alternatively, do the voting numbers simply establish “a relevant 
historical event” took place in the House without a court impeaching or questioning the 
proceeding, with the issue of validity being decided separately from those events? If so, no question 
of privilege arises. In deciding which position is legally correct, it should be noted that the Speaker 
of the House made no application to intervene in the Ngaronoa litigation. And the authors of the 
latest edition of McGee: Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand cite Shaw v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
for the proposition that: “The High Court has jurisdiction to make a declaration on the validity of 
a statute in terms of the procedure followed for its enactment … .”113 However, this discussion 
makes no mention of the issue of judicial consideration of parliamentary proceedings. Nor do the 
authors address the shift in analysis from the text’s first edition, which stated that s 268’s 
application purely was a matter for the House’s exclusive cognisance. And, of course, the House’s 
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view is not dispositive of this issue in any case. Under the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014, s 8(3), 
“All courts and all persons acting judicially must take judicial notice of those privileges, immunities, 
and powers.” Whether privilege does apply to a given case is thus a question of law, which only 
the courts can answer.114 
 This unexplored question about the relationship between judicial enforcement of manner 
and form provisions and the House’s freedom from external interference, as well as the broader 
matter of how parliamentary sovereignty should be conceived in the contemporary constitution, 
is open textured. By that we mean that there are different reasonable answers that may be given 
to it, depending on the background political and constitutional assumptions adopted when doing 
so. As such, we should not be taken to be arguing here that the courts should have no role 
enforcing the s 268 entrenchment provision or similar legislative manner and form requirements. 
But we do think that there is a great deal more argumentative work required to establish that they 
ought to have such a role in our contemporary constitutional arrangements, especially given that 
this would represent a complete change in understandings as to what s 268 was assumed to do. As 
such, absent that argumentative work, it would be wrong for a court to simply declare, fiat lux et 
facta est lux, that such a power exists. 
 
5: Conclusion 
None of the matters we have discussed in this article were addressed at any previous stage of the 
Ngaronoa litigation, nor were they raised in any significant way during oral argument before the 
Supreme Court. This silence reflected the Crown’s concession that if the 2010 ban on prisoners 
voting involved an amendment to a reserved provision, the failure to conform to s 268(2)’s manner 
and form requirement when passing it rendered the legislation invalid. In hindsight, that 
concession may have been somewhat premature. And even given that concession, the Supreme 
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Court really still ought to have required submissions on the matter. Otherwise, it risked finding 
itself in a position where it concluded a reserved provision had been amended other than as s 268 
required but without the necessary resources to decide what to do about that fact. That would 
have represented a real failure of judicial practice. 
 However, given the situation the Court found itself in, its decision to defer a final decision 
on the enforceability of the s 268 entrenchment provision probably was wise. But it then seems 
highly unlikely that another opportunity for the courts to consider the matter will soon present 
itself, given the unfailing respect that the House has shown towards that section’s procedural 
requirements. As such, a combination of political propriety and judicial caution may mean that we 
never actually get a determinative answer to the question of whether the courts are able to enforce 
a legislatively imposed manner and form provision. That state of affairs will continue to irk those 
who crave certainty in their laws. However, it seems particularly appropriate for New Zealand’s 
customary constitution, where so much of our operating assumptions continue to work on an “it 
depends” basis. 
